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Speciesism is the assigning of different values or rights to beings on the basis of their species membership. The term was created by British psychologist Richard D. Ryder in 1973 to denote a prejudice against non-humans based on morally irrelevant physical differences.[1] "I use the word 'speciesism'," he wrote in 1975, "to describe the widespread discrimination that is practised by man against other species ... Speciesism is racism, and both overlook or underestimate the similarities between the discriminator and those discriminated against."[2] The term is mostly used by animal rights advocates, who argue that it is irrational or morally wrong to regard sentient beings as objects or property. Philosopher Tom Regan argues that all animals have inherent rights and that we cannot assign them a lesser value because of a perceived lack of rationality, while assigning a higher value to infants and the mentally impaired solely on the grounds of being members of a specific species. Others argue that this valuation of a human infant, a human fetus, or a mentally impaired person is justified, not because the fetus is a fully rational human person from conception, nor because the mentally impaired are rational to the same degree as other human beings; but because the teleological and genetic orientation of any human being from conception is to develop into a rational human being and not any other creature, and because all humans have an implicit origination from two genetically human beings, and hence, both a primary genetic orientation and primary origination as the reproduction of other human beings, even if in a not fully developed state or if partially impaired.[3] In this view, anyone who is born of human parents has the rights of human persons from conception, because the natural process of reproduction has already been initiated in biologically human organisms. Peter Singer's philosophical arguments against speciesism are based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. Some philosophers and scientists argue that speciesism is an acceptable position as a form of human supremacy.
[edit] ProponentsSome philosophers and scientists defend Speciesism as an acceptable if not good behavior for humans. Carl Cohen, a Professor of Philosophy at the Residential College of the University of Michigan, writes:
Jeffrey Alan Gray, British psychologist and a lecturer in experimental psychology at Oxford, similarly wrote that:
A common theme in defending speciesism tends to be the argument that humans "have the right to compete with and exploit other species to preserve and protect the human species".[6] [edit] OpponentsGary Francione's position differs significantly from that of Singer, author of Animal Liberation (1975). Singer, a utilitarian, rejects moral rights as a general matter and, like Ryder, regards sentience as sufficient for moral status. Singer maintains that most animals do not care about whether we kill and use them for our own purposes; they care only about how we treat them when we do use and kill them. As a result, and despite our having laws that supposedly protect animals, Francione contends that we treat animals in ways that would be regarded as torture if only humans were involved. Richard Dawkins touches briefly on the subject in The Blind Watchmaker and The God Delusion, elucidating the connection to evolutionary theory. He compares former racist attitudes and assumptions to their present-day speciesist counterparts. In a chapter of former book entitled "The one true tree of life", he argues that it is not just zoological taxonomy that is saved from awkward ambiguity by the extinction of intermediate forms, but also human ethics and law. He describes discrimination against chimpanzees thus:
Dawkins more recently elaborated on his personal position towards speciesism in a live discussion with Singer at The Center for Inquiry on December 7, 2007.[8]
David Nibert seeks to expand the field of sociology "in order to understand how social arrangements create oppressive conditions for both humans and other animals". He compares speciesism to racism and sexism.[9] Some have suggested that simply to fight speciesism is not enough because intrinsic value of nature can be extended beyond sentient beings, termed the ethic of "libertarian extension".[10] This belief system seeks to apply the principle of individual rights not only to all animals but also objects without a nervous system such as trees, plants and rocks.[11] Ryder rejects this in writing that "value cannot exist in the absence of consciousness or potential consciousness. Thus, rocks and rivers and houses have no interests and no rights of their own. This does not mean, of course, that they are not of value to us, and to many other painients, including those who need them as habitats and who would suffer without them." [12] [edit] Great ape personhood
Main article: Great Ape personhood Great Ape personhood is a concept in which the attributes of the Great Apes are deemed to merit recognition of their sentience and personhood within the law, as opposed to mere protection under animal cruelty legislation. This would cover matters such as their own best interest being taken into account in their treatment by people.[13] [edit] Animal holocaustMain article: Animal rights and the Holocaust David Sztybel holds that the treatment of animals can be compared to the Holocaust in a valid and meaningful way. In his paper Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust? using a thirty-nine-point comparison Sztybel asserts that the comparison is not offensive and that it does not overlook important differences, or ignore supposed affinities between the human abuse of fellow animals, and the Nazi abuse of fellow humans. The comparison of animal treatment and the Holocaust came into the public eye with People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals' "Holocaust on your Plate" exhibit. Sztybel equates the racism of the Nazis with the speciesism inherent in eating meat, or using animal by-products particularly those produced on factory farms.[14] However, even among the supports of the concept of speciesism as a critical tool, such comparisons are not always supported. Y. Michael Barilan writes that speciesism is not the same thing as "Nazi racism" because Nazi racism extolled the abuser and condemned the weaker and the abused. He describes speciesism as the recognition of rights on the basis of group membership rather than solely on the basis of moral considerations.[15] [edit] In fictionIn science fiction and fantasy, speciesism takes on the idea of superiority via sentience. In science fiction, the speciesism tends to take the form of the various sentient species—which is to say, aliens—in the fictional universe discriminating against one another. Babylon 5, for instance, provides ample examples: humans hating Minbari, Minbari distrusting humans, Centauri hating Narns(and vice-versa). In fantasy, it tends to be among the various "races" of the fictional world. A fairly representative (if flippant) example is Terry Pratchett's explanation of speciesism in his Discworld universe:
[edit] Criticism[edit] Philosophical A painting of the Trial of Bill Burns, showing Richard Martin with the donkey in an astonished courtroom, leading to the world's first known conviction for animal cruelty, a story that delighted London's newspapers and music halls. (Rev.) John Tuohey writes that the logic behind charges of speciesism fails to hold up, and that, although it has been popularly appealing, it is philosophically flawed. Tuohey claims that, even though the animal rights movement in the United States has been influential in slowing and in some cases stopping biomedical research involving animals, no one has offered a clear and compelling argument for the equality of species[16]. Nel Noddings has criticized Peter Singer's concept of speciesism for being too simplistic, and failing to take into account the context of species preference as concepts of racism and sexism have taken in to account the context of discrimination against humans.[17] Some people who work for racial or sexual equality have said that comparisons between speciesism and racism or sexism are insulting,[18] for example Peter Staudenmaier writes:
Although Camilla Kronqvist sympathizes with Singer’s aims, she does not accept his arguments. She writes "To say that our morality rests on attending to somebody’s pleasure and pain, also seems to be a pretty crude description of what it is to be a moral being." And concludes "I also find it highly unlikely that a polar bear would care for my interests of leading a long, healthy life if it decided to have me for lunch, and I wonder if I would have time to present it with Singer’s arguments when it started to carry out this intention."[20] Singer responds that that fact that animals are not moral agents does not prevent them from being moral patients, just as humans who are not moral agents remain moral patients, so that their ability to be harmed remains the characteristic taken into consideration. Some more radical opponents of the idea of speciesism believe that animals exist so that humans may make use of them, be it for food, entertainment or other uses. This special status conveys special rights, such as the right to life, and also unique responsibilities, such as stewardship of the environment.[citation needed] Carl Cohen argued that racism and sexism are wrong because there are no relevant differences between the sexes or races. Between people and animals however, there are significant differences, and they do not qualify for Kantian personhood, and as such have no rights.[21] Animal rights advocates point out that because many humans do not qualify for Kantian personhood, and yet have rights, this cannot be a morally relevant difference. Objectivists argue that giving more rights to animals means taking rights away from thinking beings who are, unlike animals, capable of creating value. Animal rights advocates respond by pointing out that not all humans are capable of "creating value" by this definition of value, so if "creating value" were the morally relevant characteristic, it would still not track along the lines of species alone. Conversely, any definition of "creating value" that included all humans would include many animals as well.[citation needed] [edit] ReligiousSome believers in human exceptionalism base the concept in the Abrahamic religions, such as the verse in Genesis 1:26 "Then God said, “Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness; and let them rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over the cattle and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.” " Animal rights advocates argue that dominion refers to stewardship and does not denote any right to mistreat other animals, which is consistent with the Bible.[22] Buddhism, despite its reputation for respect for animals, explicitly accords humans a higher status in the progression of reincarnation.[23] Animals may be reincarnated as humans, but only humans can reach enlightenment.[23] Felipe Fernández-Armesto writes that early hunter-gatherer societies such as the Innu [24] and many animist religions lacked a concept of humanity and placed non-human animals and plants on an equal footing with humans.[25] [edit] ScientificSee also: Animal experimentation Others take a secular approach, such as pointing to evidence of unusual rapid evolution of the human brain and the emergence of "exceptional" aptitudes. As one commentator put it, "Over the course of human history, we have been successful in cultivating our faculties, shaping our development, and impacting upon the wider world in a deliberate fashion, quite distinct from evolutionary processes.[26] Constance K. Perry asserts that the use of 'non-autonomous' animals instead of humans in risky research can be based on solid moral ground and is not necessarily speciesism.[27] [edit] See also[edit] References
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