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Spanair Flight JK 5022, from Barajas Airport in Madrid to Gran Canaria Airport in Gran Canaria, Spain, crashed just after take off from runway 36L of Barajas Airport at 14:25 CEST (12:25 UTC) on 20 August 2008. The aircraft was a McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registration EC-HFP. It was the first fatal accident for Spanair (part of the SAS Group) in the 20-year history of the company, and the 14th fatal accident and 24th hull loss involving MD-80 series aircraft. It was the world's deadliest aviation accident in 2008 and Spain's deadliest in 25 years.[1] 154 people died, six while en route to the hospital, one overnight and one in the hospital three days later.[2][3]
[edit] CrashThe aircraft, christened "Sunbreeze", registration EC-HFP,[4] (manufacturer's serial number 53148, Douglas line number 2142)[5] had been delivered to Korean Air on 18 November 1993 and was acquired by Spanair in July 1999. When it took off it was carrying a total of 172 people of which 162 were passengers, four deadheading crew members and six flight crew.[6] The accident occurred at 14:25 local time, seconds after takeoff.[4][6][7] The aircraft rolled to the right,[8] and crashed in the vicinity of the runway, breaking into at least two parts which were engulfed by the subsequent explosion. Spanair reported that the pilot had previously attempted and aborted a departure due to a sensor reporting excessive temperature in an air intake, and that the temperature sensor was de-activated on the ground (reportedly an established procedure since that sensor is redundant), delaying departure by over an hour.[9] Another takeoff was attempted, during which the fatal accident occurred.[10] The flight was also a Star Alliance codeshare operated on behalf of Lufthansa as LH 2554.[11] Seven passengers with Lufthansa tickets had reservations. Four of the Lufthansa passengers were from Germany; however, the number of Lufthansa passengers who boarded the flight is yet to be confirmed.[12] [edit] CasualtiesInitial reports underreported the number of casualties. Of the 172 people on board, 146, including all crew members, perished in the crash or immediately after in the violent fire; of the 26 passengers hauled alive from the crash site six died before arriving at the hospital, and two more in hospital, bringing the total number of fatalities to 154.[4][10][13][14][15][2][16][17][18] According to government officials, at least 15 of the deceased were not Spanish, including at least five Germans, two French, a Mauritanian, a Turk, a Bulgarian, a Gambian, an Italian, an Indonesian and two Brazilians. Among the survivors were at least three non-Spanish citizens; a Swede, a Finn and a Bolivian.[19] Also a 30 year old woman with British and Spanish dual citizenship survived with no burns as she was flung from row 6, still attached to her seat, and landed in a nearby stream. She suffered a punctured lung and broken left arm. Because of this ejection, she did not receive burns that the majority of the other passengers suffered.[20] Ervigio Corral, the head of the emergency services rescue team, said that the crash flung many of the survivors into a creek, lessening the severity of their burns.[21] [edit] Investigation[edit] SummaryA preliminary report on the accident was released by CIAIAC, the Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents Investigation Commission, on 10 October (in Spanish[22], now with official English translation[23]). Flight data recorders showed that the aircraft had taken off with flaps at 0°, and that the alarm for that abnormal takeoff configuration had not sounded. The report hinted at no other cause of the accident, and excluded both the engines and thrust-reversers as causes of the accident. Before its official issue, by 16 September, a 12-page draft of that report[24][25] had been leaked onto the internet.[26] On August 17, 2009, CIAIAC released an interim report on the incident (available in Spanish[27] and an official English translation[28]). The interim report confirmed the preliminary report's conclusion that the crash was caused by an attempt to take off with the flaps and slats in an abnormal configuration, and noted that safeguards that should have prevented the crash failed to do so. These safeguards were both procedural and technological: the pilots failed to confirm that the flaps and slats were correctly configured for takeoff, and the automated system that should have warned the pilots of an abnormal configuration failed to do so. The report also made a number of safety recommendations intended to prevent incidents like this from happening again.[29] Representatives from the US National Transportation Safety Board, the aircraft manufacturer Boeing (as successor to McDonnell Douglas, the original aircraft manufacturer), and the engine manufacturer Pratt and Whitney are supporting the investigation.[citation needed] [edit] Timeline
Some early eye-witness accounts had suggested that the aircraft had suffered an engine fire or explosion before crashing, but the Spanish airport authority AENA released a video showing that the engines neither exploded nor caught fire during take-off.[30][31] Manuel Bautista, Director General of Spain's civil aviation authority, went as far as to state: "The engine is not the cause of the accident",[30] surmising that a chain of events combining together was more likely than a single cause.[32] There has been considerable interest in the faulty air temperature probe that initially caused the pilot to turn the plane back for maintenance before its catastrophic takeoff attempt. The mechanic simply deactivated the probe because the aircraft's Minimum Equipment List allowed it to be left inoperative. On August 22 investigators interviewed the mechanic, who defended his action by saying that it had nothing to do with the crash. Spanair has supported the mechanic's view that deactivation of the probe is an accepted procedure.[33] On 1 September a report, quoting Spanair, stated that the problem detected on the first takeoff attempt was overheating caused by a temperature gauge's de-icing system, rather than a dysfunction of the temperature gauge itself and that since icing was not a risk on that flight, that the de-icing system had been deactivated by the mechanic with captain's approval.[34][35] Aviation Week reported that the probe was a total air temperature sensor, located on the front of the aircraft near the cockpit.[36] The aircraft's computer uses total air temperature to help calculate the ambient air temperature, which in turn is needed to calculate the aircraft's true airspeed. True airspeed is needed for high altitude navigation, but is not so important for maintaining stable flight. Ground Speed is calculated directly from GPS position change (or Inertial navigation position change on earlier models). When TAS (true airspeed) is compared with Groundspeed, however, the actual wind direction and speed at that altitude can be calculated and presented to the pilot. Indicated airspeed, a measure of the relative wind over the aircraft's surfaces, is a more important measure for ensuring stable, safe flight. The aircraft's stall speed closely relates to indicated airspeed, for example.
Reports suggested that investigators were focusing on the possibility that the thrust reverser of the No. 2 (right side) engine activated during the climb[citation needed], since it was found to be in the deployed position in the wreckage. Indeed one of the photographs [1] released on the day of the accident appears to show a deployed reverser. If the reverser deployed during takeoff, and not as a result of impact, it has been suggested that the plane would have yawed suddenly to the right.[37] Since the MD-82 has tail-mounted engines, however, positioned quite close to each other, and close to the plane's longitudinal axis, the activation of a reverser may not have produced uncontrollable yaw, even though the situation may still have been critical.[38] Thrust reversers are normally employed just after touch down to reduce braking distances.[39] Evidence which has more recently come to light suggests that the aircraft took to the sky with a known pre-existing problem with one of its thrust reversers, which was the subject of a temporary "work around" to keep the aircraft operational.[40] On 7 September, El Mundo reported that the thrust reverser deployment was commanded after the crash, to bring the aircraft to a stop; the left reverser deployed normally, while the right one (with the pre-existing condition) did not. If this last suggestion is accepted, then the deployment of one or both thrust-reversers, deliberate or otherwise, would not appear to be the direct cause of the crash.
The Wall Street Journal reported that investigators examining data from the flight data recorder had concluded that the crew did not fully extend the wing flaps prior to take off; that an alarm for that condition failed to sound due to an apparent electrical fault and that the engines did not catch fire or malfunction before impact.[41] Failure to extend flaps and slats has caused an earlier MD-82 crash, Northwest Airlines Flight 255, where the plane had similarly failed to gain altitude, as noted early on by the investigators.[42] In that accident the crew had similarly been disrupted from routine operation before the fatal takeoff, and the alarm similarly had not sounded. In that accident, however, examination of the alarm and its circuit breaker had not revealed any fault.[43]
El Mundo, citing a source in the investigation team, reported that the cockpit voice recorder showed that the pilot had said "Flaps OK, Slats OK" to the co-pilot.[44] The article confirmed that the flaps had not been extended and that the alarm for that condition had not sounded. Spanish officials have reportedly stated since that the information leaked to The Wall Street Journal and to El Mundo (summarised above) was incomplete, but have not denied its veracity.[45] In an article published on 7 September, El Mundo stated that during the flight preparation and takeoff attempts, the aircraft had some of its systems in flight mode rather than ground mode. If true, this might explain why de-icing of the Total Air Temperature probe activated on the ground, causing overheat, since in flight the heater would activate only when there was no air flow in the probe, a sign of icing. This might also explain why the flaps and slats alarm had not sounded, since this alarm is disabled in flight mode.[46][47] The maintenance logbook of the airplane has comments, 2 days before the crash, for an "autoslats failure" visual alarm occurring on slats extension; however autoslats are not used on takeoff, and it can not be inferred that the slats system had a defect. The logbook also shows that overheating of the air temperature sensor occurred repeatedly the day before the crash.[48][49][50]
The Spanish newspaper El País made available, on its website, a video capturing the crash[2] and which had been examined by the official investigating team. The video, from an airport security camera, showed the aircraft gaining very little altitude, returning to the ground, apparently just to the right of the runway, continuing forward for some distance beyond the end of the runway and then dropping into the river-bed and catching fire.
The BBC reported that the judge investigating the crash was to question three mechanics on suspicion of manslaughter. These were the two mechanics who checked the plane before take-off and the head of maintenance for Spanair at Barajas.[51]
The Spanish Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents Investigation Commission (CIAIAC) issued an interim report on the result of their Investigation.[3]
[edit] See also
Flaps / Slats . NASA. http://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/flap.html [edit] References
[edit] External links
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