Mario Benjamin Menéndez
Born 1929 or 1930
Mario Menéndez (right) with Leopoldo Galtieri, the President of Argentina, in April 1982 on the Falkland Islands.
Allegiance	Argentina
Service/branch	Argentine Army
Battles/wars	Falklands War

Mario Benjamin Menéndez (b. 1929 or 1930–present) was an Argentine governor of the Falkland Islands. He also served in the Argentine Army. He surrendered Argentine forces to Britain during the Falklands War.

[edit] Biography

[edit] Pre-Falklands War

In March 1982, Menéndez was a general in the Argentine Army, and the commander of the Buenos Aires first corps.^[1]

[edit] Falklands War

On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands, which was British territory, and gained control that day. On 3 April, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced that British forces had been dispatched to recapture the islands. Menéndez arrived in Stanley (the capital of the Falkland Islands) on 7 April, with the purpose of taking over the governorship of the Falklands.^[2] One book described him as a "competent soldier".^[2] Menéndez competed with the senior representatives of the Argentine navy and air force for dominance; a competition which was formally concluded on 26 April when Menéndez appointed himself head of the Malvinas Joint Command, an action which was approved by the Argentine government.^[3] Two Argentine brigadier generals commanded forces in the Falklands.^[3] They were both senior to Menéndez, and treated his orders as suggestions.^[3] Menéndez planned to fight an attrition campaign against the British forces, from fixed defences.^[4] The plan was later criticized, but historian Duncan Anderson contended after the war that the plan "suited admirably the capabilities of the soldiers he had at his disposal".^[4]

British troops landed onto the islands in May, and inflicted a number of defeats upon the Argentine defenders during the course of the month. When British forces won at the Battle of Goose Green on May 29, "the gloom and despondency that gripped Menéndez and his headquarters soon infected many Argentine officers".^[5] As British forces prepared in early June to assault a number of hills near Stanley, Menéndez was pressured to try to attack the Falklands settlement of Fitzroy, which had recently come under British control, but he decided to stay on the defensive.^[6] After the hills were captured by the British, Menéndez considered withdrawing his forces from Stanley, and holding an airfield located nearby.^[7]

On 14 June, Menéndez spoke with Leopoldo Galtieri-the President of Argentina-by radio regarding the situation.^[7] Galtieri said that Menéndez should counter-attack against the British forces with all of his soldiers, and told him that the Argentine military code stipulated that a commander should fight until he has lost 50% of his men and used 75% of his ammunition.^[7] He also added "the responsibility today is with you", which Duncan Anderson argues was the point at which Menéndez's morale finally broke.^[8] Menéndez replied, "I cannot ask more of my troops, after what they have been through...We have not been able to hold on to the heights...We have no room, we have no means, we have no support...".^[8] Anderson said that Menéndez was then psychologically isolated, and believed he had been deserted by his government, and started communicating almost gratefully with a Spanish-speaking British officer who had got in touch with him by radio.^[8] Menéndez agreed to meet with representatives of the commander of British land forces on the islands that afternoon, and Menéndez surrendered his forces in the evening.^[8]

[edit] Post-Falklands War

Within a month after the surrender, Menéndez had been removed from his positions of power.^[9] According to Menéndez's mother, Hilda Villarino de Menéndez, her son was arrested in October 1983 by the Argentine Army, and sent to a base for 60 days of disciplinary detention.^[10] She said that the arrest had "apparently something to do" with a book her son had published, which covered his experiences during the war.^[10]

[edit] Legacy

In retrospect, historians Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins criticized the fact that the Argentine Army had failed to defend key features on the Falklands, interdict the British advance, or harass or counter-attack against positions that had been captured by the Royal Marines or British paratroopers, and contended that Menéndez may have lacked confidence in the ability of Argentine conscript soldiers to do these things,^[11] as well as suggesting that Menéndez was shocked by the fact that the British were determined to recapture the islands and he never recovered from this.^[12] They do argue that Menéndez's general deployment of his forces was sound, however.^[9]

[edit] Footnotes

[edit] Sources

• Anderson, Duncan (2002). The Falklands War 1982. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-84176-422-1. 
• Hastings, Max; Simon Jenkins (1997). The Battle for the Falklands. London: Pan Books. ISBN 0-330-35284-9.