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Len Saputo - Getting To The Heart of Health Care openexchange.org | HolEssence - Len Buchanan holessence.com | Len Hain hlttv.org.au | - Interview with football legends Len Dawson and Bart... vantageoncology.com |
Len Sassaman (born 1980) is an advocate for privacy, current maintainer of the Mixmaster anonymous remailer code and remop of the randseed remailer. He was employed as the security architect and senior systems engineer for Anonymizer. Currently he is a PhD candidate at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, as a researcher with the COSIC research group, led by Bart Preneel. David Chaum and Bart Preneel are his advisors. Mr. Sassaman is considered[who?] a cypherpunk and privacy advocate. He worked for Network Associates on the PGP encryption software, is a member of the Shmoo Group, a contributor to the OpenPGP IETF working group, the GNU Privacy Guard project, and frequently appears at technology conferences like DEF CON. Sassaman is the co-founder of CodeCon along with Bram Cohen, co-author of the Zimmermann-Sassaman key-signing protocol, and was an organizer of the protests following the arrest of Dmitry Sklyarov. On February 11, 2006, at the fifth CodeCon, Sassaman proposed to returning speaker and noted computer scientist Meredith L. Patterson during the Q&A after her presentation, and they are now married[1]. The couple has worked together on several research collaborations, including a critique of privacy flaws in the OLPC Bitfrost security platform[2]. Meredith's current startup, Osogato, aims to commercialize Meredith's Support Vector Machine-based "query by example" research. Len and Meredith announced Osogato's first product, a downloadable music recommendation tool, at SuperHappyDevHouse 21 in San Francisco. In 2009, Dan Kaminsky presented joint work with Sassaman and Patterson at Black Hat in Las Vegas, showing multiple methods for attacking the X.509 certificate authority infrastructure. Using these techniques, the team demonstrated how an attacker could obtain a certificate that clients would treat as valid, for domains the attacker did not control.[3][4] [edit] See also[edit] References[edit] External links
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