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The Iraqi Army is the land army of the Iraqi military, active in various forms since being formed by the British during their mandate over the country after World War I. Today, it is a component of the Iraqi security forces tasked with assuming responsibility for all Iraqi land-based military operations following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Because of the ongoing Iraqi insurgency, the Iraqi Army is designed to be an objective counter-insurgency force for a period of time until the insurgency is diminished to a level that the police can handle.[3] Thereafter, the Iraqi Army will undergo a modernization plan which includes purchasing more heavy equipment. The Army is currently being developed by the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) commanded by US Army Lieutenant General Frank G. Helmick. The Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army is General Babaker Shawkat B. Zebari. [edit] History[edit] Post WWI to the Kingdom of IraqFrom 1533 to 1918, Iraq was under Ottoman rule. Iraqis fought as part of the Ottoman Army. The first Iraqi military forces established by the British were the Iraq Levies, several battalions of troops tasked to guard the Royal Air Force bases from which the British controlled Iraq. The threat of war with Turkey, who claimed the Ottoman vilayet of Mosul as part of their country, led the British to form the Iraqi Army proper on the 6th of January 1921 the Musal Al-Kadhum Brigade consisting on ex-Iraqi-Ottoman Officers their Barracks were located in Al Kazemiyah, and an air force six years later.[4] [edit] Royal Iraqi ArmyIn August 1921, the British established Hashemite King Faisal I as the client ruler of the British Mandate of Iraq. Faisal had been forced out as the King of Syria by the French. Likewise, British authorities selected Sunni Arab elites from the region for appointments to government and ministry offices in Iraq. The Kingdom of Iraq was granted official independence in 1932 in accordance with an agreement signed by the United Kingdom in 1930, whereby the United Kingdom would end its official mandate on the condition that the Iraqi government would allow British advisers to take part in government affairs, allow British military bases to remain, and a requirement that Iraq assist the United Kingdom in wartime.[5] Upon achieving independence in 1932, political tensions arose over the continued British presence in Iraq, with Iraq's government and politicians split between those considered pro-British politicians such as Nuri as-Said who did not oppose a continued British presence and anti-British politicians, such as Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, who demanded that remaining British influence in the country be removed.[6] From 1936 to 1941, five coups by the Royal Iraqi Army (RIrA) occurred during each year led by the chief officers of the Army against the government to pressure the government to concede to Army demands.[6] During the 1941 Iraqi coup d'état Prime Minister Taha al-Hashimi resigned and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani took his place. Ali did not overthrow the monarchy, but installed a more compliant Regent, and attempted to restrict the rights of the British under the treaty from 1930. [edit] Anglo-Iraqi WarNotable early RIrA operations included the May 1941 Anglo-Iraqi War, during which the Iraqi Army had four infantry divisions[7] with some 60,000 men.[8] At full strength, each division had three brigades. The Iraqi 1st and 3rd Divisions were stationed in Baghdad. Also based within Baghdad was the Independent Mechanized Brigade comprised of a light tank company, an armoured car company, two battalions of "mechanized" infantry transported in trucks, a "mechanized" machine-gun company, and a "mechanized" artillery brigade. The Iraqi 2nd Division was stationed in Kirkuk, and the 4th Division was in Al Diwaniyah, on the main rail line from Baghdad to Basra. Unlike the modern use of the term "mechanized," in 1941 "mechanized" for the RIrA meant transported by trucks. Today "mechanized infantry" is typically transported by armoured personnel carriers or by infantry fighting vehicles and it is "motorized infantry" that is transported in trucks. On April 30 the RIrA established itself on the high ground to the south of RAF Habbaniya. An Iraqi envoy was sent to demand that no movements, either ground or air, were to take place from the base. The British refused the demand and then themselves demanded that the units of the RIrA leave the area at once. After a further ultimatum given in the early hours of May 2 expired, at 0500 hours the British began bombing the Iraqi troops threatening the base. Hostilities lasted from 2 May to 30 May 1941. Rashid Ali al-Gaylani fled and, after his departure, the British would continue to occupy Iraq for many years afterward.[citation needed] After the Anglo-Iraqi War ended, Nuri as-Said returned as Prime Minister and dominated the politics of Iraq until the overthrow of the monarchy and his assassination in 1958. Nuri as-Said pursued a largely pro-western policy during this period.[9] [edit] 1948 Arab-Israeli WarIn the 1948 Arab-Israeli War the Iraqis deployed an expeditionary force which peaked at 15-18,000 men.[10] In 1948, Iraq had an army of 21,000 men in 12 brigades and the Royal Iraqi Air Force had 100 planes, mostly British. Initially the Iraqis committed around 3,000[11] men to the war effort including four infantry brigades, one armoured battalion and support personnel. These forces were to operate under Jordanian guidance[12] During the first truce the Iraqis increased their force to about 10,000.[13] Ultimately, the Iraqi expeditionary force numbered around 15,000 to 18,000 men.[14] The first Iraqi forces to be deployed reached Jordan in April 1948 under the command of General Nur ad-Din Mahmud. On 15 May, Iraqi engineers built a pontoon bridge across the Jordan River and attacked the Israeli settlement of Gesher with little success. Following this defeat Iraqi forces moved into the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm strategic triangle, where they suffered heavy casualties in the Israeli attack on Jenin which began on 3 June, but they managed to hold on to their positions. Active Iraqi involvement in the war effectively ended at this point.[15] [edit] Republic DeclaredHashemite monarchy lasted until 1958, when it was overthrown through a coup d'état by the Iraqi Army, known as the 14 July Revolution. King Faisal II along with members of the royal family were executed. The coup brought Abd al-Karim Qasim to power. He withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and established friendly relations with the Soviet Union. When Qāsim distanced himself from Abd an-Nāsir, he faced growing opposition from pro-Egypt officers in the Iraqi army. `Arif, who wanted closer cooperation with Egypt, was stripped of his responsibilities and thrown in prison. When the garrison in Mosul rebelled against Qāsim's policies, he allowed the Kurdish leader Barzānī to return from exile in the Soviet Union to help suppress the pro-Nāsir rebels. In 1961 a buildup of the Army close to Kuwait, in conjunction with Iraqi claims over the small neighbouring state, led to a crisis with British land forces deployed to Kuwait for a period. In 1961, Kuwait gained independence from Britain and Iraq claimed sovereignty over Kuwait. As in the 1930s, Qasim based Iraq's claim on the assertion that Kuwait had been a district of the Ottoman province of Basra, unjustly severed by the British from the main body of Iraqi state when it had been created in the 1920s.[16] Britain reacted strongly to Iraq's claim and sent troops to Kuwait to deter Iraq. Qāsim was forced to back down and in October 1963, Iraq recognized the sovereignty of Kuwait. Qāsim was assassinated in February 1963, when the Ba'ath Party took power under the leadership of General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr (prime minister) and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif (president). Nine months later `Abd as-Salam Muhammad `Arif led a successful coup against the Ba'ath government. On 13 April 1966, President Abdul Salam Arif died in a helicopter crash and was succeeded by his brother, General Abdul Rahman Arif. Following the Six Day War of 1967, the Ba'ath Party felt strong enough to retake power (17 July 1968). Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became president and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). [edit] Six Day WarDuring the Six Day War, 100 Iraqi tanks and an infantry division were readied near the Jordanian border. The Iraqis were supposed to be the main Arab strength on the Jordanian front, but the strong Iraqis columns never reached their destination in time. Repeated Israeli airstrikes held them up so that by the time they did reach the Jordan River the entire West Bank was in Israeli hands. During the course of the Jordanian Campaign ten Iraqis were killed and 30 Iraqis were wounded, especially as the main battle was in Jerusalem. Fighting also raged in other areas of the West Bank, where Iraqi commandos and Jordanian soldiers defended their positions. [17] In 1967-1968 Iraqi communists launched an insurgency in southern Iraq.[18] Barzānī and the Kurds who had begun a rebellion in 1961 were still causing problems in 1969. The secretary-general of the Ba`th party, Saddam Hussein, was given responsibility to find a solution. It was clear that it was impossible to defeat the Kurds by military means and in 1970 a political agreement was reached between the rebels and the Iraqi government. Following the Arab defeat in 1967, Jordan became a hotbed of Palestinian resistance. During this time PLO elements attempted to create a Palestinian state within Jordan caused the Jordanians to launch their full military force against the PLO. As they were doing this Syria invaded Jordan and Iraq stationed a brigade in Rihab, Jordan. Otherwise the only Iraqi activity was that they fired upon some Jordanian aircraft. In July 1979, President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr resigned, and his chosen successor, Saddam Hussein, assumed the offices of both President and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. He was the de facto ruler of Iraq for some years before he formally came to power. The Baath Party was now a country wide organisation, reaching down to the smallest village and most modest neighbourhood in an unprecedented way. In addition, the Popular army and the youth organisation brought ever larger numbers into the paramilitary formations established by the regime. [edit] Iran-Iraq warLater, Saddam Hussein, looking to build fighting power against Iran soon after the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War doubled the size of the Iraqi army from 1981, when it numbered 200,000 soldiers in 12 divisions and 3 independent brigades, to 1985, when it had 500,000 men in 23 divisions and nine brigades. The war came at a great cost in lives and economic damage - a half a million Iraqi and Iranian soldiers as well as civilians are believed to have died in the war with many more injured and wounded - but brought neither reparations nor change in borders. The conflict is often compared to World War I,[19] in that the tactics used closely mirrored those of the 1914-1918 war, including large scale trench warfare, manned machine-gun posts, bayonet charges, use of barbed wire across trenches and on no-mans land, human wave attacks and Iraq's extensive use of chemical weapons (such as mustard gas) against Iranian troops and civilians as well as Iraqi Kurds. [edit] Invasion of Kuwait and Gulf WarBy the eve of the Invasion of Kuwait which led to the 1991 Gulf War, the Army had 1,000,000 men, 42 infantry and seven armoured divisions, and 20 special forces brigades, grouped in seven corps, plus six Iraqi Republican Guard divisions.[20] Although it was said at the time in Western media that Iraqi troops numbered approximately 545,000 (even 600,000) today most experts think that both the qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the Iraqi army at the time were exaggerated, as they included both temporary and auxiliary support elements. Many of the Iraqi troops were also young, under-resourced and poorly trained conscripts. Demolished Iraqi vehicles line the Highway of Death on 18 April 1991. The widespread support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war meant Iraq had military equipment from almost every major dealer of the world's weapons market. This resulted in a lack of standardization in this large heterogeneous force, which additionally suffered from poor training and poor motivation. The majority of Iraqi armoured forces still used old Chinese Type 59s and Type 69s, Soviet-made T-55s from the 1950s and 1960s, and some T-72s from the 1970s in 1991. These machines were not equipped with up-to-date equipment, such as thermal sights or laser rangefinders, and their effectiveness in modern combat was very limited. The Iraqis failed to find an effective countermeasure to the thermal sights and the sabot rounds used by the M1 Abrams, Challenger 1 and the other Coalition tanks. This equipment enabled Coalition tanks to effectively engage and destroy Iraqi tanks from more than three times the distance that Iraqi tanks could engage. The Iraqi tank crews used old, cheap steel penetrators against the advanced Chobham Armour of these US and British tanks, with disastrous results. The Iraqi forces also failed to utilize the advantage that could be gained from using urban warfare — fighting within Kuwait City — which could have inflicted significant casualties on the attacking forces. Urban combat reduces the range at which fighting occurs and can negate some of the technological advantage that well equipped forces enjoy. Iraqis also tried to use Soviet military doctrine, but the implementation failed due to the lack of skill of their commanders and the preventive air strikes of the USAF on communication centers and bunkers. The exact number of Iraqi combat casualties is unknown, but known to be heavy. Immediate estimates said up to 100,000 Iraqis were killed. Some now estimate that Iraq sustained between 20,000 and 35,000 fatalities. However other figures still maintain fatalities as high as 200,000.[21] A report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, estimated 10,000-12,000 Iraqi combat deaths in the air campaign and as many as 10,000 casualties in the ground war.[22] This analysis is based on Iraqi prisoner of war reports. It is known that between 20,000 and 200,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed. Saddam Hussein's government gave high civilian casualty figures in order to draw support from the Islamic countries.[citation needed] The Iraqi government claimed that 2,300 civilians died during the air campaign. According to the Project on Defense Alternatives study,[23] 3,664 Iraqi civilians and between 20,000 and 26,000 military personnel were killed in the conflict. 75,000 Iraqi soldiers were wounded in the fighting. [edit] Between the Gulf WarsThe International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated the Army's composition immediately after the 1991 War as 6 'armoured'/'mechanised' divisions, 23 infantry divisions, 8 Republican Guard divisions and four Republican Guard internal security divisions.[24] Jane's Defence Weekly for 18 July 1992 stated that 10,000 troops from 5 divisions were fighting against Shia Moslems in the southern marshlands. The IISS gave the Iraqi Army's force structure as of 1 July 1997 as seven Corps headquarters, six armoured or mechanised divisions, 12 infantry divisions, 6 RGF divisions, four Special Republican Guard Brigades, 10 commando, and two Special Forces Brigades.[25] It was estimated to number 350,000 personnel, including 100,000 recently recalled reservists. [edit] Second Gulf WarIn the days leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the following Iraq War, the Army consisted of 375,000 troops, organized into 5 corps. In all, there were 11 infantry divisions, 3 mechanized divisions, and 3 armored divisions. The Republican Guard consisted of between 50,000 and 60,000 troops (although some sources indicate a strength of up to 80,000). In January 2003, before the beginning of the Second Gulf War, the force was primarily located in eastern Iraq. The 5 corps were organised as follows:
US Army General Tommy Franks reportedly estimated soon after the invasion that there had been 30,000 Iraqi casualties as of April 9, 2003.[26] That number comes from the transcript of an October 2003 interview of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld by Bob Woodward. They were discussing a number reported by the Washington Post. But neither could remember the number clearly, nor whether it was just for deaths, or both deaths and wounded. The Iraqi Army was disbanded by U.S. Administrator of Iraq Paul Bremer on May 23, 2003 [27] after its decisive defeat during the Second Gulf War. [edit] New Iraqi ArmyOne of the many organizations created to take on the duties of the former Iraqi army, the New Iraqi Army was originally intended to comprise of 3 divisions numbering 40,000 soldiers in 3 years time. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (headed by Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton) was the organization set up by the United States military with the responsibility of training and development of the new army. In June 2004, it was dissolved, and passed on its responsibilities to the MNSTC-I (initially headed by Lt. Gen. David Petraeus) due to its focus on developing the military for traditional defense from a hypothetical invasion by its neighbors rather than providing security for the Iraqi people from the emerging threat posed by the Iraqi insurgency.[28] [edit] The PlanAccording to the U.S. Department of Defense, the Iraqi Army will in the end state be an approximately 300,000-person force based around an Army with 10 infantry divisions and 6 mechanized infantry division consisting of 36 brigades and 113 battalions (91 infantry, 12 special forces, 5 mechanized infantry, 60 armored battalions, 1 security). Nine Motorized Transportation Regiments, 5 logistics battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units (RSUs), and 91 Garrison Support Units (GSUs) are intended to provide logistics and support for each division, with Taji National Depot providing depot-level maintenance and resupply. Each battalion, brigade, and division headquarters will be supported by a Headquarters and Service Company (HSC) providing logistical and maintenance support to its parent organization. The Army will also include 17 SIBs and a Special Operations Forces Brigade consisting of two special operational battalions.[3] MNSTC-I commander Martin Dempsey stated June 2006 that the IA "will be built by the end of this calendar year".[29] [edit] Current StatusThe Iraqi Army has 14 divisions, 56 brigades, and 185 combat battalions. The 6th Division, 12th Division, and the 17th Division are still missing their fourth maneuver brigades. Three of the 56 brigades are not Iraqi Ground Forces Command combatant brigades and are not assigned to a division. They are the Baghdad Brigade formed in the fall of 2008, the 1st Presidential Brigade formed in January 2008, and the new 2nd Presidential Brigade formed in the spring of 2009. These three independent “praetorian” security brigades are still building and only have six combat battalions between them. [Note: This is probably the start of a Presidential Guard Division.] Budget problems are continuing to hinder the manning of combat support and combat service support units. The lack of soldiers entering boot camp is forcing Iraqi leaders at all levels to face the dual challenge of manning and training enabler units out of existing manpower. Divisions are forming engineer, logistics, mortar, and other units by identifying over-strength units, such as the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) battalions and other headquarters elements, and then transferring them as needed. Recently, the Ministry of Defense issued an order to all Iraqi Army divisions requiring analysis on the effect of dissolving the 4th Battalion in each brigade and using those soldiers to man enabler units throughout the IA. The IA continues preparation for the fielding of 120mm mortar batteries and 81mm mortar platoons. The start of unit mortar fielding is in July 2008. The New Iraqi Army excludes recruits that are former regime security and intelligence organizations members, personnel of the Special Republican Guard, top-level Ba'ath Party members, and Ba'ath Party security and militia organizations. [30] [edit] Timeline[edit] 2003
Bremer would later continue to defend his highly criticized decision stating that it was necessary to convince the Kurdish population of Iraq not to secede.[35]
[edit] 2004
[edit] 2005
[edit] 2006
[edit] 2007
[edit] 2008
[edit] StructureAs of August 2009, the 253,000 soldiers of the Iraqi Army is organized as follows:
[edit] Deployment
An Iraqi Army Ashok Leyland Truck of Indian Origin
Members of Iraqi Army 3rd Brigade, 14th Division march during their graduation ceremony Feb. 13 2008. 5 weeks after graduation, the brigade took part in Operation Knight's Assault.
[edit] Training Iraqi soldiers perform a live-fire exercise using Egyptian Maadi rifles Training of Iraqi forces was initially done by private contractors, transitioned to coalition forces, and is now done by three Iraqi training battalions. Training has been impeded by domestic instability, infiltration by insurgents, and high desertion rates.[citation needed] Since June 2004, the partnership between Coalition forces and Iraqi forces has increased due to the growing number of battalions in the Iraqi army, which then stood around 115. Out of this number, it was deemed that 80 of them were able to carry out operations in the field with Coalition support limited to logistics and strategic planning, whilst another 20-30 battlions still needed major Coalition support to carry out their operations. As of October 5, 2005 the New Iraqi Army had 90 battalions trained well enough to be "deployed independently", i.e. without the help of others such as the United States.[65] There are three levels of troop capability in the New Iraqi Army: one, two, and three. Level three refers to troops that have just completed basic training, level two refers to troops that are able to work with soldiers, and level one refers to troops that can work by themselves. Members of NATO's training mission in Iraq (NTM-I) opened a Joint Staff College in ar-Rustamiya in Baghdad on September 27, 2005 with 300 trainers. Training at NATO bases in Norway, Italy, Jordan, Germany, and Egypt have also taken place and 16 NATO countries have allocated forces to the training effort.[66] MNF-Iraq are also conducting ongoing training programs for both enlisted men and officers including training as medics, engineers, quartermasters, military police, and so forth. Outside of the various courses and programs being held in-country, both American staff colleges and military academies have begun taking Iraqi applicants, with Iraqi cadets being enrolled at both the United States Military Academy and the US Air Force Academy.[67] [edit] Recruits and enlisted menIraqi Army recruits undergo a standard eight week [2] basic training course that includes basic soldiering skills, weapons marksmanship and individual tactics. Former soldiers are eligible for an abbreviated three week "Direct Recruit Replacement Training" course designed to replace regular basic training to be followed by more training once they have been assigned to a unit. Soldiers later go on to enroll in more specific advanced courses targeted for their respective fields. This could involve going to the Military Intelligence School, the Signal School, the Bomb Disposal School, the Combat Arms Branch School, the Engineer School, and the Military Police School. [edit] OfficersThe Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute located in Taji plays a significant role in training aspiring Iraqi non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. The training is based on a Sandhurst model due to its shorter graduation time compared to West Point. CMATT's main recruiting stations are located in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The most desired recruits are individuals who have prior military service or are skilled in specific professions such as first aid, heavy equipment operation, food service and truck driving. A recruitment target of approximately one thousand men is desired to eventually form a 757-man battalion. Soldier fallout usually occurs due to voluntary withdrawal or failure to meet training standards. Due to the current demand for these battalions to become active as soon as possible, the first four battalions' officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men are being trained simultaneously (in separate groups). Notable differences in training between CAATT and former training under Saddam's regime include schooling in human rights, the laws of land warfare, and tolerance in a multi-ethnic team. Based on the philosophy used by the U.S. military to boost its own size in response to World War II — that an army can be built faster by focusing on the training on its leadership rather than enlisted men — CMATT has pursued a similar strategy of focusing recruitment and training on commissioned and non-commissioned officers for the remaining 23 Iraqi battalions. Upon successful completion of officer training, these groups of officers will form the battalion's leadership cadre, which will then be responsible for overseeing its own recruitment, training, and readiness of its enlisted men. It is hoped that having the Iraqi leadership train its own will overcome problems faced by CAATT's training process; namely recruitment, desertion, and unit loyalty. [edit] Military Transition TeamsAll Iraqi Army battalions have embedded U.S. Military transition teams, according to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The MiTTs advise their Iraqi battalions in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics and infantry tactics. Larger scale operations are often done jointly with American battalions. This operational training aims to make the battalion self-sustainable tactically, operationally and logistically so that the battalion will be prepared to take over responsibility for battle space. The DOD (as of March '07) reported that 6000 advisors arranged in 480+ teams were embedded with Iraqi units;[68] however, in April, the Congressional Research Service reported that only around 4000 U.S. forces were embedded with Iraqi units at a rate of 10 per battalion.[2] Command of all but one of the Iraqi Army's 14 divisions has been turned over to the Iraqi government; they are now under the command of Lt. General Ali Ghaidan Majid rather than being led by the American military.[69] [edit] Equipment New Iraqi Army T-72 A Ukrainian-built BTR-94 sits atop a flatbed truck awaiting transportation to Iraq, circa August 2004. Several hundred light armor vehicles were donated to the Iraqi government by Jordan. Virtually all of the equipment used by the former Iraqi Army was either destroyed by the U.S. and British during Operation Iraqi Freedom or was looted during the chaotic aftermath shortly after the fall of the Hussein regime. Four T-55 tanks however have been recovered from an old army base in al-Muqdadiyah and are now in service with the 1st Mechanized Division. On February 2, 2004 the U.S government announced that Nour USA was awarded a $327,485,798 contract to procure equipment for both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Guard; however, this contract was canceled in March 2004 when an internal Army investigation (initiated due to complaints from losing bidders) revealed that Army procurement officers in Iraq were violating procedures with sloppy contract language and incomplete paperwork. On May 25, 2004 the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) stated that they would award a contract worth $259,321,656 to ANHAM Joint Venture in exchange for procuring the necessary equipment (and providing its required training) for a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 35 battalions. The minimum bid would begin to be delivered immediately and further orders could be placed until the maximum of 35 battalion sets or September 2006 after the first order was fully delivered. In May 2005, Hungary agreed to donate 77 T-72's to the Iraqi Army, with the refurbishment contract going to Defense Solutions to bring the tanks up to operational status for an estimated 4.5 million dollars US.[70] After a delay in the payment of funds from the Iraqi government[71], Iraq's 9th Army Mechanized Division received the tanks at its headquarters in Taji over a three day period starting on November 8, 2005.[70] On July 29, 2005, the United Arab Emirates gained approval to purchase 180 M113A1 APCs in good-condition from Switzerland, with the intent to transfer them to Iraq as a gift. Domestic political opposition successfully froze the sale, fearing that the export would violate the country's longstanding tradition of neutrality as well as perhaps make Switzerland a target for terrorism.[72] 173 M113s, 44 Panhards, and 300 Spartans donated by Jordan, Pakistan and UAE. 600 Dzik-3 (Ain Jaria) APCs were ordered in Poland (option 1200) for delivery by Jan 2007. 573 Akrep APCs for delivery by Jan 2007. 756 Cougar H APCs (option 1050) for delivery by November 2008. 713 M1114s and 400 M1151s purchased for IA with delivery complete by end July 2006. Serbia has signed a US$230m deal with Iraq to sell weapons and military equipment, the defence ministry said in March 2008. It did not specify the weapons but Serbian military experts believe they include Serbian-made CZ-99 hand guns, Zastava M21 5.56 mm assault rifles,Zastava M84 machine guns, anti-tank weapons (M79 "Osa", Bumbar, and M90 "Strsljen"), ammunition and explosives and about 20 Lasta 95 basic trainer aircraft. Iraq's defence Minister Abdul-Qadir al-Obaidi visited Belgrade in September and November to discuss boosting military ties with Serbia.[73][74] In August 2008, the United States has proposed military sales to Iraq, which will include the latest upgraded M1A1 Abrams battle tanks, attack helicopters, Stryker armored vehicles, modern radios, all to be valued at an estimated 2.16 billion dollars.[75] In December 2008 the United States approved a 6 billion dollars arms deal with Iraq that included 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks and 400 Stryker combat vehicles for elite Iraqi army units. [76] In January 2009 U.S. defense companies and Pentagon officials announced that the Iraqi Army is planning to buy up to 2,000 retrofitted Soviet-era T-72M tanks. Redesignated as T-91s, the tanks would form the heavy core of a reconstituted force meant to be able to defend its country after most U.S. forces leave in 2011. The tanks would be bought from Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine and Slovakia, and then stripped to their frames and rebuilt under a contract managed by Defense Solutions of Exton, Pa with advanced gun systems, modern armor, and fire control systems to levels almost similar to the M1A1 Abrams. This proposal has since been discredited by Pentagon sources. [77] In February 2009 the US military announced it had struck deals with Iraq that will see Baghdad spend 5 billion dollars on American-made weapons, equipment and training.[78] [edit] Uniforms and personal weaponsThe average Iraqi soldier is equipped with an assortment of uniforms ranging from Desert Battle Uniform, 6 color "Chocolate Chip" DBDU and woodland pattern BDU to knock off US MARPAT or Jordanian KA7. Nearly all have a PASGT ballistic helmet, generation I OTV ballistic vest and radios. There light weapons consist of stocks of AKM and Type 56 assault rifles, and American M16A4 rifles and M4 carbines, the latter two to become the standard rifle. Old Soviet PKM machineguns are still used by machine/support gunners and AT soldiers use old and/or captured RPG-7s. [edit] New Equipment
[edit] Challenges and criticisms
The New Iraq Army currently faces multiple challenges it must overcome to establish itself as the premier symbol of authority in Iraq. These include: [edit] Iraqi insurgencyBased on Bush administration expectations that coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators after the overthrow of the Hussein regime, prewar planners had only been expecting minimal if any resistance from the Iraqi people. For a multitude of reasons, this ideal scenario has not materialized and now the New Iraqi Army faces an insurgency which has caused more coalition casualties than during the war itself. An increase in size as well as an increased sophistication in the nature of the attacks has seriously weakened the efforts of the New Iraqi Army to maintain internal security. [edit] EquipmentThe Iraqi Army continues to face significant challenges securing an adequate weapons supply because its equipment plans have never matched the threats it has faced. [edit] Poor weapon registrationA 2006 report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) notes that out of the 370,000 weapons turned over to the US since the fall of Saddam's regime, only 12,000 serial numbers have been recorded[79]. The lack of proper accounting for these weapons makes small arms proliferation to anti governmental forces such as insurgents or sectarian militias much easier. [edit] InfiltrationThe Iraqi Army is widely known to have been infiltrated by a multitude of groups ranging from local militias to foreign insurgents. This has led to highly publicized deaths and compromised operations (perhaps the most prominent being the 2004 attack on a US military base near Mosul in December 2004. More than 20 people, including 13 American servicemen, were killed when a suicide bomber wearing an Iraqi military uniform detonated his vest inside a dining tent.[80]). Infiltration by elements not primarily loyal to the Iraqi Army presents an ongoing danger to the lives and operations of the entire army. [edit] Inadequate intelligence gathering capabilitiesThe Iraqi Army currently has no formalized apparatus for the collection of military intelligence (similar to the DIA). Currently it must rely on intelligence provided by the United States for the majority of its operations. Developing a professional intelligence corps to augment the effectiveness of the Iraqi Army remains an ongoing challenge. [edit] Lack of adequate logistical supportThe Iraqi Army presently must rely on US logistical support to conduct the majority of its operations[81]. It currently lacks critical support services such as transportation, medevac capabilities, medical logistics, and intelligence. Until the Iraqi Army can develop these capabilities, it will continue to depend on US forces for support. [edit] Insufficient advisory effortAs of October 2006, there are approximately 4000 US combat advisors embedded with Iraqi units out of 130,000 US soldiers stationed in that country. Defense analyst Andrew Krepinevich argues that the roughly twelve advisors per Iraqi battalion (approximately 500 troops) is less than half the sufficient amount needed to efficiently implement the combat advisory effort [82]. Krepinevich argues that officers try to avoid taking on advisory tasks because the potential for promotion is much lower due to the US Army's culture of promoting officers that have served with a domestic unit over ones that have served with foreign forces. [83] [edit] No military judicial punishment systemThe Iraqi Army currently lacks a military judicial punishment system thus giving those in command little leverage over subordinates who would choose to disobey orders. [edit] Ineffective leadership at the Ministry of DefenseThe current Minister of Defense, Abd al-Qadr Muhammed Jassim al-Obaidi, has limited experience and faces a number of hurdles impeding his effective governance. Some of the major problems include inheriting a staff that is notorious for favorism, corruption, and deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. He rivals with the Minister of the Interior, Jawad al-Bolani, National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubai, and Minister of Staff for National Security Affairs, Shirwan al-Waili. He has been criticized for not being able to stand up to the Badr Organization and Mehdi Army members which dominate his own party. In addition, as a Sunni he faces inherent challenges working within a Shiite-dominated government. [edit] Iranian influenceAn estimated 150 Iranian intelligence officers, plus members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Command, are believed to be active inside Iraq at any given time[84]. For more than a year, US troops have detained and recorded fingerprints, photographs, and DNA samples from dozens of suspected Iranian agents in a catch and release program designed to intimidate the Iranian leadership[84]. Iranian influence is felt most heavily within the Iraqi Government, the ISF, and Shiite militias. [edit] GovernmentalIranian influence is felt heavily within the SCIRI and its armed wing the Badr Organization. An unnamed US intelligence analyst has commented that Iran funds many different groups to ensure substantial influence regardless of which faction is likely to dominate the political or military power base [85]. [edit] InsurgencyInterrogation of members from the Qazali terror network revealed that the group had received substantial Iran-based training in explosives technology; arms and munitions; and some cases of advice. All this is alleged by the U.S. military to have taken place through the Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps[86]. It is also known that Iran supports Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. [edit] No national banking systemPoor levels of internal security have stifled attempts to build any national banking or credit systems. In lieu of such organizations, Iraqi units operate at any given time with an estimated 10-20% absenteeism rate due to soldiers temporarily leaving their units to deliver income back to their families [87]. This can be especially grueling if the unit is on deployment outside of their home province as the absenteeism time is naturally increased. [edit] Lack of military medical servicesAll military hospitals under the Saddam regime were looted and abandoned during the 2003 invasion of Iraq; as such, the Iraqi Army currently fields no military hospitals[88]. There is only one military prosthetics facility in the country and virtually no mental health or burn treatment services. Wounded Iraqi soldiers are expected to receive treatment either at civilian hospitals or if possible, at Coalition medical facilities[88]. Corruption practices spurred partly by over-taxation at these civilian hospitals significantly drive up costs to the soldier. Due to overwhelming red tape within the Iraqi military compensation system, it is commonplace for the soldier to end up bearing the financial brunt of medical expenses[88]. [edit] See also
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[edit] Further reading
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