United States v. Carolene Products Co.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 6, 1938 Decided April 25, 1938
Full case name	United States v. Carolene Products Company
Citations	304 U.S. 144 (more) 58 S. Ct. 778; 82 L. Ed. 1234; 1938 U.S. LEXIS 1022
Prior history	Demurrer to indictment sustained, 7 F. Supp. 500 (S.D. Ill. 1934)
Holding
The Filled Milk Act did not exceed the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, or violate due process under the Fifth Amendment. Southern District of Illinois District Court reversed.
Court membership
Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes Associate Justices James C. McReynolds · Louis Brandeis Pierce Butler · Harlan F. Stone Owen J. Roberts · Benjamin N. Cardozo Hugo Black · Stanley F. Reed
Case opinions
Majority	Stone, joined by Hughes, Brandeis, Roberts, Black (except the part designated "Third")
Concurrence	Butler
Dissent	McReynolds
Reed, Cardozo took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. art. I; U.S. Const. amend. V; 21 U.S.C. § 61-63 (1938) (Filled Milk Act § 61-63)

United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938),^[1] was an April 25, 1938 decision by the United States Supreme Court. The case dealt with a federal law that prohibited filled milk (skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or cream) from being shipped in interstate commerce. The defendant argued that the law was unconstitutional on both Commerce Clause and due process grounds.

The previous term, the Court, under pressure from the Roosevelt administration's court-packing plan, had dramatically changed its Commerce Clause jurisprudence to enlarge substantially those activities considered to be in or to affect interstate commerce; however, it has been argued that the "switch in time that saved nine" followed the natural progression of Justice Roberts' earlier opinions (it was his swing vote in the New Deal 5-4 decisions that authorized the more intensive regulation of the economy).^{[citation needed]} It had also altered its settled jurisprudence in the area of substantive due process, that is, the constitutional law dealing with rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. These changes meant that many New Deal programs that the Court would previously have invalidated would henceforth be found constitutional.

The defendant company was charged with breaking the law described above, and at trial it had filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the law was unconstitutional. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois had granted the defendant's motion, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the District Court's ruling.

Justice Harlan Stone, writing for the Court, found that the law, being "presumptively constitutional" was essentially a legislative judgment, and hence was not for the courts to overrule. Applying rational-basis review, the Court held that the law was supported by substantial public-health evidence, and was not arbitrary or irrational.

Contents 1 Footnote Four 1.1 Text of Footnote Four 2 Criticism 3 See also 4 References 5 Further reading

[edit] Footnote Four

Carolene Products is best known for its "Footnote Four", which is considered to be "the most famous footnote in constitutional law." ^[2] The Court applied minimal scrutiny (rational basis review) to the economic regulation in this case, but proposed a new level of review for certain other types of cases.

Justice Stone suggested there were reasons to apply a more exacting standard of judicial review in other types of cases. Legislation aimed at discrete and insular minorities, who lack the normal protections of the political process, should be an exception to the presumption of constitutionality, and a heightened standard of judicial review should be applied. This idea has greatly influenced equal protection jurisprudence, and judicial review.

[edit] Text of Footnote Four

“

There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth… It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious … or national … or racial minorities …: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.

”

Footnote Four introduced the idea of levels of judicial scrutiny. In keeping with the New Deal Revolution, Footnote Four established the rational basis test for economic legislation, an extremely low standard of judicial review. The "rational basis test" mandates that legislation (whether enacted by Congress or state legislatures) which deals with economic regulation must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

Therefore, Footnote Four outlines a higher level of judicial scrutiny for legislation that met certain conditions:

1. On its face violates a provision of the Constitution (facial challenge).
2. Attempts to distort or rig the political process.
3. Discriminates against minorities, particularly those who lack sufficient numbers or power to seek redress through the political process.

This higher level of scrutiny, now called "strict scrutiny", was first applied in Justice Black's opinion in Korematsu v. U.S. (1944).

Some argue that this "most famous footnote" was in fact written not by Justice Stone, but by his law clerk, Louis Lusky.^[3] In fact, the cited work above (while quite useful on the origin and growth of the footnote) does not claim that the law clerk was the author, and implies the opposite through letters between the justices.

Depending on the Justice, it can be common practice for a law clerk to draft an initial version of the opinion. This was not, apparently, Justice Stone's practice.^[4]

[edit] Criticism

Geoffrey P. Miller argues that “the statute upheld in the case was an utterly unprincipled example of special interest legislation. The purported public interest justifications so credulously reported by Justice Stone were patently bogus. … The consequence of the decision was to expropriate the property of a lawful and beneficial industry; to deprive working and poor people of a healthful, nutritious, and low-cost food; and to impair the health of the nation's children by encouraging the use as baby food of a sweetened condensed milk product that was 42 percent sugar.”^[5]

[edit] See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 304
• Nebbia v. New York (1934)

[edit] References

[edit] Further reading

• Balkin, Jack M. (1988). "The Footnote". Northwestern University Law Review 83: 275. ISSN 0029-3571. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/foot1.htm. 
• Levy, Robert A.; Mellor, William H. (2008). "Earning an Honest Living". The Dirty Dozen: How Twelve Supreme Court Cases Radically Expanded Government and Eroded Freedom. New York: Sentinel. pp. 181–197. ISBN 9781595230508.