In the philosophy of mind, double-aspect theory is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of the same substance. The theory's relationship to neutral monism is ill-defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements to determine whether the group is mental, physical, both, or neither, double-aspect theory requires the mental and the physical to be inseparable and irreducible (though distinct).^[1] Notable double-aspect theorists include Baruch Spinoza, Gustav Fechner, Arthur Schopenhauer, George Henry Lewes, and Thomas Nagel. David Chalmers explores a double-aspect view of information.

The particle physicist and Christian philosopher, John Polkinghorne, argues for "dual aspect monism" "there is only one stuff in the world (not two - the material and the not yet material) in a space where the two contrasting states (material and the space to be material phases, can occur, a physicist might say) this explains our perception of the difference between mind and matter: therefore, mind matters."^[2]

[edit] See also

• Property dualism

[edit] Notes

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