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Mozambican Presidential Jet

Accident summary
Date	October 19, 1986
Type	Controlled flight into terrain
Site	Mbuzini, Lebombo Mountains, South Africa 25°54′58″S 31°57′19″E / 25.91611°S 31.95528°E / -25.91611; 31.95528Coordinates: 25°54′58″S 31°57′19″E / 25.91611°S 31.95528°E / -25.91611; 31.95528
Passengers	35[1]
Crew	9[1]
Fatalities	34[1]
Survivors	10[1]
Aircraft type	Tupolev Tu-134A-3
Operator	Mozambique Air
Tail number	C9-CAA
Flight origin	Maputo, Mozambique
Last stopover	Mbala Airport (MMQ),[1] Zambia
Destination	Maputo International Airport (MPM), Mozambique

The Mozambican presidential Tupolev Tu-134A-3 aircraft crashed just inside South African territory on October 19, 1986. The aircraft was carrying Mozambican president Samora Machel and 43 other occupants on a flight from Mbala in Zambia to the Mozambican capital Maputo when it crashed 35 nm (65 km) west of its destination at Mbuzini in the Lebombo Mountains.^[2] Nine passengers and one crew member survived the crash, but President Machel and 33 others died, including ministers and officials of the Mozambique government.

While there was widespread suspicion—both nationally and internationally^[2]—that the South African government was implicated in the crash, no conclusive evidence to this effect has emerged.

Contents 1 Political background 1.1 1984 1.2 1986 2 Return flight 2.1 A 37º turn 2.2 Disorientation and confusion 2.3 Descent and impact 3 Investigations 3.1 South African response 3.2 On site investigation 3.3 South African investigation 3.4 Joint investigations 3.5 Margo Commission 3.5.1 Findings 3.5.2 Claims of a decoy beacon 4 Other investigations 4.1 Soviet report 4.2 Independent Mozambican investigation 4.3 TRC report 2001 4.4 Confession by Hans Louw 4.5 2006 inquiry 5 Aftermath 5.1 1996 Anniversary 5.2 1999 Monument 5.3 2006 Anniversary 5.4 Nelson Mandela's and Graça Machel's accusations 5.5 Economic impact 6 References 7 Further reading and external links

[edit] Political background

[edit] 1984

South Africa's State Security Council (SSC) meeting in January 1984 minuted a discussion of their Mozambican working group, which included General Jac Buchner and Major Craig Williamson, where assistance to RENAMO was discussed as a means of overthrowing the FRELIMO government of Mozambique. The TRC later included this minute as circumstantial evidence in their inconclusive report.^[3]

On March 16, 1984, the Nkomati Accord was signed at Komatipoort between South Africa and Mozambique. A clause in this agreement prohibited support of third-party resistance groups. In his commentary on the accord, South African foreign minister Pik Botha admitted in an SABC television interview that South Africa had offered limited support to RENAMO in the past.

[edit] 1986

On October 7, 1986 Mozambique was sharply criticised by South African general Magnus Malan for allegedly allowing terrorists to enter South Africa from its territory.^[4] The Frontline States convened an emergency meeting in Maputo on October 12, to address an incursion of Renamo operatives from Malawi. South Africa and Malawi's Banda were denounced as waging a terrorist campaign against Mozambique. Malan replied on October 15 by warning the Front Line leaders that they would share the consequences of ANC terrorist attacks.^[5] Mozambique later cited Malan's remarks as evidence to implicate South Africa in the air crash.^[6]

A former military intelligence (MI) officer "Ben" alleged at the 1998 TRC hearings that Pik Botha and a number of high-ranking security officials met on October 18, 1986 at Skwamans, a secret security police base shared with MI operatives halfway between Mbuzini and Komatipoort. He said the meeting broke up later that day and Botha departed in a small aircraft.^[3]

On Sunday, October 19, three Front Line leaders, Machel, Kenneth Kaunda and Eduardo dos Santos met at Mbala, Zambia, to confront Zairian president Mobutu Sésé Seko concerning his channeling of funds to UNITA, which was in alliance with South Africa.^[5]

[edit] Return flight

On the afternoon of October 19, 1986, President Samora Machel returned from the Zambian meeting on the presidential Tupolev Tu-134A aircraft, a personal gift from the Soviets.^[2] The aircraft, with registration number C9-CAA, was approaching Maputo in the first hour after sunset and the flight crew were in relaxed discussion with one another, as revealed by the cockpit voice recorder.

[edit] A 37º turn

Around 19:10, 11 minutes prior to impact, at a height of 19,000 feet (5,800 m) the presidential aircraft made a 37º turn to the right, and headed in the wrong direction of Matsapa airfield, Swaziland.^{[3][7][8][9][10]} The navigation facility for this turn was never determined. Nor did the crew identify the facility to one another or to Maputo air traffic control. Rather than continuing over the Mozambican plain to Maputo’s airport near sea level, C9-CAA then headed towards the Lebombo Mountains region on the South African border.

The Soviet investigation team would later offer this deviation as evidence that the crew were led astray by a possible ‘decoy navigation beacon’.^[3][7] The Mozambican investigation team then suggested a temporary South African military camp, 150m from the crash site, as the likely source and claimed there was an electrical generator present. South Africa in turn identified the tents in question as a volleyball facility for soldiers.^[7]

[edit] Disorientation and confusion

Maputo air traffic control was said^[7][11] to have cleared the aircraft for a descent to 3,000 ft, the published safe altitude for approaches to Maputo.^[10] While descending the pilot, Yuri Novodran, was determined (by the South African-appointed Margo Commission) to have taken a rigid view as to the location of the airport and declined the indirect approach suggested by his crew.

Novodran, unable to discern the runway lights at Maputo International Airport, decided they were not switched on and informed the air traffic controller: "Check your runway lights". The controller apparently misinterpreted this as "I check your lights" or "I see you",^[7] and continued to clear the aircraft for landing. The Margo Commission concluded this was another alleged instance of pilot error.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Descent and impact

At 19:19:55, 1:45 minutes before impact, the aircraft descended to under 3,000 feet (910 m). The Margo Commission concluded this was before clearance for landing was received. The aircraft continued to descend at regular intervals, at an average rate of 8 feet a second, for a direct approach to the runway without visual contact.^[2] The ground proximity warning system was activated, and sounded for 32 seconds, but was ignored by the crew. Believing themselves to be over the Mozambican plain, the descent continued with landing gear and flaps still retracted.^[2][10] The Soviet investigation team later declared the crew's disregarding of the alarm as reasonable.^{[citation needed]}

At 19:21:39, the aircraft made controlled impact in hilly terrain at 230 knots (430 km/h), at an altitude of 2,187 feet (667 m) a.s.l. and 150m into South African territory.^[2] The point of impact is near the hamlet of Mbuzini in the Lebombo Mountains. The first witnesses at the crash scene were reported^[who?] to have been Mozambican soldiers. Captain Marques’s Boeing C9-BAA which approached Maputo 14 minutes behind C9-CAA, apparently encountered no confusing radio beacon.^[7]

According to the next day’s SABC news report, and based on injuries sustained,^[5] president Machel died instantly when the aircraft crashed. Besides Machel, his private secretary Muradali, possible successor Fernando Honwana, transport minister Alcantara Santos, marxist scholar and diplomat Aquino de Bragança and photo-journalist Daniel Maquinasse were among the dead.^[5] In all, thirty-four occupants died while 10 survived.

[edit] Investigations

[edit] South African response

South Africa’s minister of Law and Order, Louis la Grange, contacted South African foreign minister, Pik Botha, at 4:30 on October 20, 1986 to inform him of the crash. A Beeld newspaper report, however, claimed it was the SAP.

La Grange revealed that ‘30 to 40 persons’ may have died which may include president Samora Machel and suggested ‘very sensitive handling’ of the situation. Pik Botha relayed the information to State President P.W. Botha and together they decided that Pik Botha should visit the scene as a matter of urgency.

In accordance with the South African Air Control Act, aircraft accidents are required to be investigated by the SA Department of Transport. Thus Pik Botha consulted Hendrik Schoeman of the Department of Transport, once Machel’s death was confirmed. After Botha and Schoeman had visited the crash site, Botha cited special circumstances and other international protocols as reasons to become involved.^[6]

[edit] On site investigation

The Mozambican government was informed of the situation and invited to send representatives to the border town of Komatipoort. Mozambican minister Sérgio Vieira joined Pik Botha at Komatipoort from where they departed by SAAF helicopter. The helicopter was only able to transport one of two members of the Civil Aviation Bureau, Mr. Pieter de Klerk, who was asked to offer guidance on site.

On arrival, Mozambican minister Sérgio Vieira asked for the documents that were taken from the aircraft to be handed to him. The SA commissioner of police, Johann Coetzee, had already made copies of these, and the documents were transferred to Vieira. The SABC was permitted to take photos at the scene and to do on location reports, the only news agency enabled to do so. The South African government claimed that the Civil Aviation Bureau had no complaints about procedures followed at the site. Nonetheless, the flight data and cockpit voice recorders were removed by the South African Police, who later refused to release them for independent inspection.^[6][7][12]

[edit] South African investigation

On the day after the crash, October 20, Mozambique and South Africa agreed that an international board of inquiry should be established with the participation of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Chicago Convention determined that South Africa, as the state on whose territory the crash had occurred, would head the investigation. South Africa was obliged to work in partnership with the state of ownership (Mozambique) and the state of manufacture (Soviet Union).

Twelve days following the crash, at 18:00 on October 31, 1986, Pik Botha convened an interdepartmental government meeting, nominally to discuss progress.

After the meeting, Pik Botha made press announcements to the effect that the aircraft was fitted with antiquated instruments and that tests on two dead crew members revealed excess alcohol content in their bloodstream.^[5][7] On a November 6 press conference Botha in addition announced that a document retrieved from the plane revealed a Mozambican-Zimbabwean plot to topple the Malawian government.^[5] Pik Botha was reported to have told Lothar Neethling of the SAP to withhold the flight data– and cockpit voice recorders from inspection by both international and Civil Aviation Bureau investigators.^[6][7][12] Soviet and Mozambican investigators were thus placed at a disadvantage in their investigations.

[edit] Joint investigations

Director Renee van Zyl of the South African Civil Aviation Bureau then served a writ on Botha and the SAP, and received the two recorders unceremoniously at 15:45 on November 11, 1986. The three international teams signed a protocol of secrecy on November 14, 1986^[7] as Botha’s selective announcements were straining relations^[5] between the teams and governments. This allowed the teams to agree on the procedures they were to follow.

Nevertheless Botha reported to Beeld newspaper on November 24, 1986 that he had listened to Maputo air traffic control’s recordings and studied a transcription of them. These he acquired from Foreign Affair’s representative in the South African team.

[edit] Margo Commission

The South African government established the Margo Commission, chaired by judge Cecil Margo, to investigate the accident. Pik Botha realised that negative international opinion was escalating around the matter and decided to appoint three international members of high standing to the commission.^[6] They were:

• Frank Borman, former US test pilot, astronaut and president of Eastern Air Lines
• Geoffrey Wilkinson, former head of the British Department for Transport’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch
• Sir Edward Eveleigh, former Lord Justice of Appeal and member of the British Privy Council

[edit] Findings

The Margo commission’s findings were based mainly on the flight recorders, testimony by South African officials and the technical report submitted by the SA investigation team. The Soviet investigation team refused to take part in any public testimony and the Mozambican team also withdrew at the last moment.

The flight recorders gave excellent results, the cockpit voice recorder especially revealing much about the interactions between crew members. The investigation was however delayed for several weeks by South African police general Lothar Neethling's refusal to hand the recorders over after he had seized them at the scene of the crash.^[7]

The commission also levelled criticism at Pik Botha for ‘ignoring civil aviation acts’.^{[cite this quote]} Botha was further accused of preventing aviation officials from reaching the crash site and of illegally transferring bodies to Mozambican officials.^{[citation needed]} This was claimed^[who?] to result in the loss of documents essential to a successful investigation.

The commission nevertheless concluded that:^[1]

• "the aircraft was airworthy and fully serviced
• there is no evidence of sabotage or outside interference,
• the cause of the accident was that the flight crew failed to follow procedural requirements for an instrument let-down approach,
• the crew continued to descend under visual flight rules in darkness and some cloud without having contact with the minimum assigned altitude,
• the crew also ignored the Ground Warning Proximity alarm."

The Margo report was accepted by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

[edit] Claims of a decoy beacon

Suspicion of a beacon in the Lebombos was first expressed by South African helicopter pilots on the morning following the crash, followed by a similar suggestion in an anonymous call to UPI by a supposed SAAF officer, a day later.^[5] The pilots' speculative remark was revealed to Sérgio Vieira, Mozambique's minister of security, in a rash comment by South African police commissioner Johann Coetzee.^[5] Neither the Mozambican or Russian teams however, nor any witness testimony given, supplied any evidence or direct allegation concerning a secondary beacon to the Margo commission.^[2] The Margo commission's draft report then proposed Matsapa airfield's VOR, combined with pilot error, as playing a likely role in the trajectory followed. The USSR delegation disputed this, saying the signal was obscured by mountains.^[2]

A breakdown in communications followed, causing Gen. Earp of the South African Air Force to authorise military pilots to penetrate Mozambique airspace to test the Matsapa theory.^[2] They returned with confirmation, though the final report relied on additional testimonies of commercial pilots who flew on C9-CAA's track. They likewise confirmed clear VOR signals from Matsapa.^[2] Mozambican pilot Dias, who supported the Matsapa theory, illustrated his interpretation of events to Mozambican officials on a flight from Lisbon to Maputo.^[9][10] Mozambican authorities however remained unconvinced and suspended air controller de Jesus on May 5, 1998, for allegedly having been bribed to tamper with Maputo airport's beacon on the night of the crash.^[13]

[edit] Other investigations

[edit] Soviet report

The Soviet delegation issued a minority report saying that their expertise and experience had been undermined by the South Africans. They advanced the theory of complicity of South African security forces and that the plane had been intentionally diverted by a false navigational beacon signal, using a technology provided by Israeli intelligence agents. The Soviet report focused on the 37 degrees' right turn that led the plane into the hills of Mbuzini. It rejected the finding of the Margo Commission, saying that the crew had read the ground proximity warning as false since they believed themselves to be in flat terrain as they approached landing.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Independent Mozambican investigation

Mozambique contracted an independent and highly qualified Canadian (or British) investigator by the name of Young.^[when?] Relying on flight plots by Mozambican expert Caiger, Young questioned the false radio beacon theory as an explanation for the wrong trajectory. In his opinion a false VOR beacon operating on the same frequency would have directed the aircraft on a curvilinear path. This was contradicted by the straight paths recorded for both the C9-CAA presidential aircraft and the C9-BAA aircraft which followed minutes afterward.^[2][7]

[edit] TRC report 2001

Twelve years after the crash, when the apartheid regime had been replaced by a democratically-elected South African government, a special investigation into Machel's death was carried out in 2001 by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

The TRC investigation was criticized^[who?] for taking place in camera and without any aviation specialist being present. The testimony was further led by a prominent radio journalist rather than a judge. The TRC's investigation did not find conclusive evidence to support or refute either of the earlier reports. Nonetheless, some pieces of circumstantial evidence collected by the TRC lead to questions being raised^[who?] about a number of the Margo Commission's findings:

• A former Military Intelligence (MI) officer alleged that Pik Botha and a number of high-ranking security officials held a meeting at Skwamans, a secret security police base shared with MI operatives halfway between Mbuzini and Komatipoort, on the day before the crash. They left late that night in a small plane and some, including Pik Botha, returned there after the crash.^[3]
• C9-CAA entered a military and operational zone in South Africa (a restricted airspace, which was presumed to be under radar surveillance.) However, no warning that the plane was off course or in South African airspace was given to the aircraft.^[5]
• South Africa's State Security Council (SSC) minutes from January 1984 indicate that the Mozambican working group, including General Jac Buchner and Major Craig Williamson, discussed how to help RENAMO overthrow the FRELIMO government of Mozambique.

The TRC report concluded that the questions of a false beacon and the absence of a warning from the South African authorities require "further investigation by an appropriate structure".^[3]

A police video in the TRC's possession shows South African foreign minister Pik Botha telling journalists at the crash site that President Samora Machel and others killed in the crash were his and President P.W. Botha's "very good friends", and that their deaths were therefore a tragedy for South Africa.

[edit] Confession by Hans Louw

In January 2003, the Sowetan Sunday World reported that an apartheid era killer and former CCB member, Hans Louw, serving a 28-year term at Baviaanspoort Prison near Pretoria, had confessed to participating in a plot to kill Machel. A false radio navigational beacon would have been used to lure the aircraft off course, with Louw forming part of an alleged backup team to shoot the aircraft down if it didn't crash.^[14][15][16] The newspaper also alleged that another of the plotters, former Rhodesian Selous Scout, Edwin Mudingi, supported Louw's claim.^[17] However, after an investigation by the Scorpions,^[12][18] a South African special police unit, it was reported in July 2003 and in October 2008 that they could find no evidence for South African complicity.^[7][19]

[edit] 2006 inquiry

South African minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula announced on February 2, 2006 that the Machel death crash inquiry would be reopened. He told reporters in parliament that all of South Africa's law enforcement agencies were expected to be involved in the probe, in co-operation with their Mozambican counterparts.^[20][21]

[edit] Aftermath

[edit] 1996 Anniversary

A Mbuzini wreath laying ceremony on October 17 was attended by Graça Machel and addressed by Nelson Mandela. Mandela declared the initial simple memorial a South African national monument and hailed Machel as a universal hero whose life exemplified the highest ideals of internationalism and universality. Mandela cautiously claimed that the precise chain of events leading to Machel's death were uncertain and elusive, and repeated an earlier promise that no stone would be left unturned to establish the full truth.^[2][22][23]

[edit] 1999 Monument

A memorial was erected at the crash site. Designed by Mozambican architect, Jose Forjaz, at a cost to the South African government of 1.5 million Rand (US$ 300,000), the monument comprises 35 whistling wind pipes to symbolise each of the lives lost in the air crash. It was inaugurated on January 19, 1999 by Nelson Mandela, his wife Graça, and by President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique.

[edit] 2006 Anniversary

At the 20th anniversary of the crash on October 19, 2006, South African president, Thabo Mbeki declared the memorial a national heritage site.^[24] Leading up to the event the Mozambican president Guebuza, who chaired the Mozambican inquiry in 1986, repeated a commitment to discover the truth about the incident,^[25] while President Mbeki, in his state of the nation address of February 3, 2006, mentioned that a satisfactory explanation was still lacking.^[26]

[edit] Nelson Mandela's and Graça Machel's accusations

At the Mandela-Machel wedding ceremony on July 18, 1998, Mandela was however reported to have announced that Samora Machel was murdered, without reference to the South African board of enquiry's findings.^[2] Graça Machel believes the air crash was no accident and has dedicated her life to tracking down her late husband's killers. In May 1999, Graça Machel said in an interview on SABC TV's News Maker programme that she remained convinced the apartheid regime was responsible, and challenged former foreign minister Pik Botha to come clean about Samora Machel's death. In reply, Botha told SABC TV on May 16, 1999 that although he had been one of the first people on the scene and was called on to identify Machel's body, the only facts he knew about the crash were the findings of the Margo Commission:^[27]

“

"I totally reject any suggestion that I could have been a party to a decision of that nature. It is an extremely sad moment for me. - Pik Botha

”

[edit] Economic impact

A study by Jones and Olken^[28] claims that the crash had immediate wider repercussions for Mozambique's economy. An annual 7.7% decline in GDP under Machel's communist nationalisation policies, reverted to growth averaging 2.4% per annum under the freer, multi-party democracy in the tenure of his successor, Joaquim Chissano.

[edit] References

[edit] Further reading and external links

• A Morte de Samora Machel, João M. Cabrita, 2005. Novafrica, Maputo
• Clayburn, Yvonne (1989). Soviet disinformation strategy as applied to Samora Machel death crash. Institut für Afrikanische und Internationale Studien. http://books.google.com/books?id=Aj7LHgAACAAJ. 
• Mystery still surrounds Machel death
• Photos of the aircraft

v • d • e ← 1985 Aviation accidents and incidents in 1986 1987→ Space Shuttle Challenger disaster (January 28) — Mexicana Flight 940 (March 31) — TWA Flight 840 (April 2) — Hindawi affair (April 17) — Air Lanka Flight 512 (May 3) — Aeroméxico Flight 498 (August 31) — Pan Am Flight 73 (September 5) — Mozambican Tupolev Tu-134 crash (October 19) — British International Helicopters Chinook crash (November 6) — Iraqi Airways Flight 163 (December 25) Bold indicates incidents resulting at least 50 deaths (current article is always in bold) Orange color indicates the deadliest incident in 1986